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Abstract: I show that the quantum measurement problem can be understood if the
measurement is seen as a “speech act” in the sense of modern language theory. The
reduction of the state vector is in this perspective an intersubjectice – or better a-
subjective – symbolic process. I then give some perspectives on applications to the
“Mind-Body problem”.
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1 Introduction: “Realism” is an Idealism
Science, and in particular physics, is a perpetual fight against absolute base-
ments and essences: space, simultaneity, heat as phlogistic, ether, proper-
ties of quantum objects. Relativity theory and quantum physics have shown
all the benefits of the renouncement of essences such as ether and values
of physical quantities. Such essences do not belong to experience and are
only the fruit of imagination (more exactly they represent an abstraction
constructed out of experience thanks to a priori concepts). In this sense,
if by “realism” one means the belief that there is an essence behind ex-
perience, realism is an idealism. An “objective underlying reality” is only
a word (expressing a desire of reality) and there is nothing behind or be-
yond it. Since the present meeting is also devoted to “the subjective”, it is
worthwhile to point out that the same phenomenological and constructivist
approach holds also for the mental world and that for instance “the” mind
(as an essence) has also to be renounced.
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2 The quantum measurement
2.1 Reminder of the problem
Although the rules of quamtum mechanics are well known, it is better, for
clarity, to recall them. They rest on primitive notions such as ”system”,
”state of a system”, ”observable” and can be summarized as follows:
• R1 Every system S is described by a Hilbert space Hilb.
• R2 Any state of the system is described by a ψ ∈ Hilb
• R3 In absence of measurement, the system evolves according to the
Schro¨dinger equation ih¯∂ψ/∂t = Hψ, where H is the hamiltonian of
the system
• R4 A physical quantity (observable) is described by an operator A on
Hilb
• R5 The only possible outcomes of a measurement of the observable
represented by A are the proper values ai of A, with the corresponding
proper vectors: Aψi = aiψi.
• R6 The result of the measurement of A on the system in a state ψ is
random with a probability given by pi = | < ψi|ψ > |
2
• R7 After the measurement the system is in the state ψi (“state vector
collapse”).
There is a kind of duality in these fundamental concepts and rules, since
rules R1 - R3 deal with the description of the system, while rules R4 -
R6 deal with observables which appear heterogeneous with respect to the
system. In this sense, the observables do not belong to the system.
It is natural for a physicist to try to describe the measurement as an
interaction between the system and the apparatus and therefore the latter
as an other system, i.e. by a state vector ψA of Hilb. But then, when
this approach is translated into the quantum formalism, a contradiction
appears. Indeed, let ψSA be the vector describing the meta-system ”system
+ apparatus” and HSA the interaction operator system-apparatus. Then:
• from (R3), after the measurement, the meta-system is in the (unique
and predictable) state ψSA(t) = e
−i/h¯HSAtψSA(0).
• from (R7), after the measurement, the system is, at random, in one
of the states ψi.
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The two final states are incompatible. That is the problem.
The central question then is: “Why does the process of observation
(giving rise to the state vector collapse, that is to a sudden transition be-
tween two states of the observed system) escape the normal evolution of
the pair system+observer described by the Schro¨dinger equation?”. There
is an even more radical question. The knowledge of the state |ψ > of the
system is necessary to predict the possible outcomes of the observation.
But it is not sufficient since, to describe the set of outcomes, we need to
add an heterogeneous element, the operator associated with the observable
which is measured. Why is this second level necessary ? I shall call it the
“question of the concept of observable”.
2.2 Why “decoherence” does not solve the problem.
Several solutions have been proposed during the past years. Some of them
modify in a way or another the foundations of quantum mechanics: hidden
variables, spontaneous localization, non linear Schro¨dinger equation, “many
worlds” (in fact many observers) interpretation etc.
A different solution, known as the decoherence theory, has been devel-
oped by Zeh, Zurek, Omne`s and others without any change in the standard
postulates. It consists in pointing out that the interaction of the system
with the environment diagonalizes very rapidly, with a very short char-
acteristic time τ and in an irreversible manner, the density matrix of the
meta-system formed by the system, the observer and the environment, thus
leading to an apparent quasi-collapse of the state vector. This explanation
has become popular since the occurence of decoherence has been experi-
mentally demonstrated (Davidovich, Brune, Raimond et al., 1996).
Unfortunately the explanation based on decoherence is not satisfying
for the following reasons. First, decoherence is a statistical notion based on
the statistical matrix representing statistical ensembles of systems. But in
a given experiment one does not deal with statistical ensembles but with
an individual system (and an apparatus). In other words, the unicity of
the result of a given experiment is not expressed by a diagonal matrix. In
mathematical terms, decoherence leads to a diagonalized matrix, while in a
single experiment all the diagonal elements of the matrix are all zero except
one. In other words, the expression
“ρ =
(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
”
is not the same as
“ρ =
(
1 0
0 0
)
or ρ =
(
0 0
0 1
)
”.
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Supporters of decoherence often reply that quantum physics makes only
statistical predictions. That statement is contradicted by predictions like
“the measurement of any component of the spin of a photon in a single
experiment will give an integer result”. In addition, the very concept of
“ensemble” presupposes that there are single individuals of the ensemble.
If quantum theory only deals with statistical predictions, it is an incomplete
theory since individual experiments escape it. A second problem with de-
cohrence refers to the question of the concept of observable (end of section
2.1). This question is in fact addressed to any attempt to describe the mea-
surement as a system-apparatus interaction. If this interaction was a good
model, it should be able to describe several aspects of a measurement with,
as only primitive concepts, those of state vectors ψS , ψA of the system and
the apparatus and the system-apparatus interaction hamiltonian. Namely:
• What is the meaning of an “observable”?
• What means “the value” of an observable?
• Why is the outcome of an experiment random, while the interaction
is deterministic?
• After the interaction why is the system precisely in one of the states
|ai >?
• Why are the only possible outcomes one of the proper values of an
operator A (that the model should construct)?
J.-S. Bell was well aware of all these difficulties when he wrote his paper
“Against measurement” (1990) where he proposed to replace observables
by “beables”.
2.3 What is really a measurement?
To be performed, a measurement needs two ingredients:
• an apparatus, object of perceptions and manipulations
• (pre-existing) mathematical symbols to express the result.
There is indeed no measurement without (or before) the expression (in
mathematical terms, for instance “A = ai”) of its result. This is not a
philosophical point of view, it is an empirical fact. In this respect, A = ai
does not reflect or translate a reality outside itself. It creates, by its own
declaration, this reality. It is this (symbolic) reality. As a matter of fact, a
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symbol is its own actualization. It means that, as a mathematical symbol,
the outcome of a measurement is not the (quantum) state of the screen
of an apparatus and, thus, cannot be described by a state vector. In pre-
quantal terms, a symbol, e.g. 1, is differrent from its pixelized image and
from its physical support, since the symbol 1 is required a priori before
any pixelisation (Figure 1). In terms of interaction, a measurement is thus
not a physical interaction (i.e. described by an Hamiltonian) between two
systems (described by state vectors), but an “interaction” between language
(discourse) and a perception.
Figure 1. The pixelisation of the symbol “ 1 “ is different from the symbol itself.
These remarks lead in a natural way to the solution I propose (Schneider
1994): the measurement act is not a physical transition or phenomenon,
but a purely semantic act, in the same line as the speech acts a. well known
in language theory. A speech act does not describe a situation independent
of itself, it creates what at the same time it describes. The measurement
act has more precisely the structure of a declaration. The question whether
this process is of psychological nature or takes places in some mind is not
relevant. A semantic process is exterior to any individual, it is existing only
as shared by the community of locutors and in this sense is objective. It
just takes place in a symbolic universe, the universe of discourse in which all
physicists live. It is the universe studied by linguistics and semiotics. It has
nothing to do with psychology. It is not the “consciousness” of the observer
which operates the state vector collapse, as was proposed by London and
Bauer (1983). It is the result of an impersonal, non psychological but em-
aFor a general introduction to these notions, see J. Austin 1982
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pirically ascertainable, production of a signifier which exists only as shared
by the community of physicists b. In other words it is not a passive regis-
tration, it is an active semantic process. The subjectivity of one observer
is to be replaced by the intersubjectivity of the discourse, with no psycho-
logical subject, where the impersonal semantic collapse of the state vector
takes place. To express it in another way, the measurement act, as giving
an attribute to a system, is an act of attribution, a declarative act. The
judicial domain can help us for an analogy: a judgement does not register
afterward a pre-existing reality, it does create it by its verdict. The judge-
ment “guilty” creates, in the judicial universe, guilt. The result of that act
is of course random and has a probability of occurence | < ai|ψ > |
2. This
conception sheds a new light on causality in the quantum measurement:
the result of a measurement act has no other cause than itself, it is its own
cause. It is in this respect that there is no quantum causality.
The “classical” character of the measurement apparatus lies in the se-
mantic nature of its description, not in its complex atomic structure (as
could naturally but erroneously be infered from the Ehrenfest theorem).
A system is a measurement apparatus only insofar as it is described by
a set of signifiers; otherwise it is nothing but a quantum system. As for
the observer, it is most certainly decomposable in atoms, but it is an ob-
server only as a support of semantems. In a measurement, the so-called
interaction with the measuring apparatus (which would be described by an
Hamiltonian) is an encounter, an interaction if one may say so, between
the observed system and the universe of discourse. Because this encounter
is not descriptible by an Hamiltonian the measurement process escapes the
Schro¨dinger equation. It was N. Bohr (1983) who was among the first au-
thors pointing out the role of language in the measurement. But for him
language was just a collection of words, the vocabulary of classical physics.
Here the point of view is different: what is important is not so much the
content, but the auto-productive nature of a signifier and it is this auto-
production which gives rise to the state vector collapse.
The idea that a measurement does not result from an interaction be-
tween a system and an apparatus has been also recently been expressed by
O. Ulfbeck and A. Bohr (2001). For these authors, quantum physics does
only deal with clicks of an apparatus. But they do not address the essential
bAccording to modern views, consciousness is on the contrary defined as being the cross-
rads of different signifier.
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question: ”What is a click?”. For instance when a click is recorded in a
movie, what is the real click? The click or the movie of the click? The
present paper explicitly claims that the objective (intersubjective) click is
the declaration: ”There is/was a click”.
We can now apply this constructivist approach to the notion of subject
and to the Mind-Body problem.
3 Mind-Body
3.1 General principles
We have seen that a measurement is the (random) emergence of a symbol
detached from (the appearance of) an apparatus. If the symbol is mathe-
matical, it is a scientific (physical) measurement.
But there can be “pre-scientific” measurements when the symbol is
vague or fuzzy such as a colour, a sound, a smale etc. There is then (at
least up to now) no mathematical representation of these vague symbols by
hermitian operators. But they do nevertheless exist (i.e. are experienced)
as symbols. All these vague symbols are not systems and have no state
vector.
A first application of vague symbols in the context of quantum physics
is the answer they provide to an argument often opposed (in particular by
J.-S. Bell) to the point of view defended here that the state vector collapse
is operated by an observer. The argument is formulated in ironic terms:
“Only physicists having their PhD can operate a state vector collapse”.
In other words, observations or experiments made without the support
of elaborated mathematics would not exist. The notion of vague symbol
provides an answer: every experience, whatever its vagueness, is legitimate
at its own level. It is a scientific measurement when it is expressed in
scientific symbols.
Vague symbols lead to a more general notion of symbol, introduced
progressively along all the XXth century by semiotics (the science of sym-
bols). Indeed, words and mathematical symbols are special types of sym-
bols. Symbols are what Cassirer calls symbolic forms. They are, like Kan-
tian concepts, a priori symbols. They belong to an unlimited variety of
registers: acoustic, graphical, gestual, conceptual, judicial, institutional,
esthetical, emotional, affective, ethical etc. They are all structured as dec-
larations designating what they construct. To be less elliptic, this structure
means that in a first step, as a declarative gesture, they produce themselves
and in a second (timeless) step they present themselves as designating from
496 Running Title
the outside, as an objective reality, what they have just created c. To illus-
trate this approach by a concrete example, the symbol “ a “ is, in a first
time, just a given letter which, in second time, designates the notion of
“symbol a”. It represents a kind of self-distanciation of symbols.
As mentioned in the introduction, no genuine “consciuosness” nor “sub-
ject” is needed . They are not genuine instances, they are constructed
objects out of two primitive instances: subject-less sensations and (declar-
ative) symbols. This construction, also called symbolization, detaches a
symbolic object from the sensation. To be more precise, there is a prim-
itive instance, the so called “object-relation” (equivalent to a sensation)
which is a complex made of a relation and its “to be” object, entangled
together. At this point, it is not relevant to ask if the object-relation is one
or two instances, since the concept of number does not apply: we are in
the realm of a “proto-arithematic” (Schneider 1994). More exactly, sym-
bolization creates attributes and an object is in a second step the synthesis
of different attributes.
3.2 Tentative quantum modelization of the Mind-Body relation
To address this question, Mind and Body have first to be defined and
characterized in the framework of the concepts presented here (Schneider
1997).
“The” mind, or the subject, as things are bad primitive concepts. They
have to be replaced by a-subjective symbols, i.e. symbols by their own,
source-less. In the present view, the “subjective” is then a particular object:
an object constructed out of ethical symbolic forms d.
The physical body is not the source of sensations. As a physiological
object, it is an abstraction constructed by a bio-physical theoretization out
of primitive and source-less sensations.
In other words, the primitive concepts are no more Mind and Body,
but sensations and symbols out of which Mind and Body are constructed
abstract objects. In particular, the body is an abstract synthesis of physi-
ological attributes resulting from symbolization.
In quantum theory, symbolic attributes (i.e. values of observables)
emerge randomly and are cause-less. By extending the notion of symbol as
cThis process leads to the notion of “afterwardness”, a non linear notion of time, de-
scribed by J. Lacan.in his work (passim)
dThe processes by which the subjective is constructed are very complex, they involve
parental and social discourses, words like “I” which precede the subject, identification
etc; rigorously speaking, the sentance “I speak” means something like “The word “I”
speaks”. That is why the traditional subjective is in reality a-subjective.
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in section 3.1, there are two types of bodies created by symbolization out
of sensations:
• the physical, or physiological body, i.e. the bio-physical description
of the body created by the conceptualization of physics
• the emotional body created by emotional symbols (words of pain, joy,
anxiety etc).
Emotional symbols are genuine, not constructible from physiological in-
stances. This conception is generalizable to non verbal symptoms (I refer
here to the psycho-analytical conception of symptoms as symbols).
Take for instance as physiological observables skin colour, cardiac rhythm,
blood pressure. The emotional observables are for instance an exchange of
words (with or without an emotional content with an interlocutor). A com-
plete discussion should include unconscious aspects, always emotional, of
symbols. The two types of observables do not “commute”, they are com-
plementary in the quantum mechanical sense: it means that an individual
cannot at the same time be subject to a physiological observation and have
emotional relationships. It is interesting to note that C. Bohr (father of N.
Bohr and biologist) wrote:
“An organism cannot at the same time be subject to a chemical
analysis and be declared as living”.
We then can have a succesion of non commutative events to describe
how an emotion can make a face blushing: white skin −→ expression of
emotion −→ pink skin. It is similar to the quantum measuremets of non
commutative components of ths spin: SX = +1/2 −→ SZ = +1/2 −→
SX = −1/2. We so have a simplified scheme for quantum modelization of
the undeterministic evolution of the body.
4 Perspectives
The main stream in current cognitive sciences is to seek a “naturalization”
of consciousness. It is an attempt to treat Mind and consciousness as ob-
jects (however immaterial they are). An essential prediction of the present
approach is that these attempts of naturalization will certainly improve our
knowledge of the physical brain but not of the mind.
Secondly, many authors attempt to reconstruct, essentially thanks to
decoherence, the classical world out of the quantum level. In the present
approach, it is the classical world which precedes the quantum level: the
latter is constructed from the behavior of macroscopic apparatuses.
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With the concept of afterwardness briefly discussed in section 3.1 (and
formalized in Schneider (1994)) it becomes possible to reformulate the no-
tion of consistent history (e.g. Omne`s 1994) and the transform it into a
notion of “afterward history” (Schneider 2000).
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